Yksilönvapaus

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Yksilönvapaus

Sisällysluettelo

Freedom Housen vapausindeksi

Eleanor Rooseveltin (vasemmistopresidentti Franklin D. Rooseveltin puoliso) ja Wendell Willkien johdolla perustettu Freedom House mittaa eri maiden vapautta.

Freedom Housen vuosiraportti 2010 (kuten 2009) sisältää kuvaajia ja taulukon eri maailman maiden vapauksista (PR = political rights, mm. äänioikeus; CL = civil liberties eli ihmisoikeudet). (indeksin kriteerit)

Kant: negatiivinen vapaus

Filosofi Immanuel Kantin mukaan vapaus on vapautta pakottamisesta ja valtiolla ei ole oikeutta rajoittaa kenenkään vapautta muuten kuin estääkseen tätä loukkaamasta toisten vapautta. [1] Tämä tarkoittaa samaa kuin negatiivinen vapaus. Jopa vasemmistoliberaali John Stuart Mill esitti suunnilleen samaa (Harm Principle).

Isaiah Berlin: liberaalit kannattavat negatiivista vapautta; sosialistit, nationalistit, autoritaristit ja totalitaristit positiivista vapautta

Filosofi Isaiah Berlinin mukaan liberaalit kannattavat negatiivista vapautta eli oikeutta päättää itse omasta elämästään. Sosialistit, nationalistit, autoritaristit ja totalitaristit kannattavat erilaisia versioita positiivisesta vapaudesta, joka ei Berlinin mielestä ole vapautta vaan itsen ohjaamista (self-direction, self-control). [2]

Viitteet

  1. Kant's Social and Political Philosophy, Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Jul 24, 2007: "The very existence of a state might seem to some as a limitation of freedom, since a state possesses power to control the external freedom of individual citizens through force. This is the basic claim of anarchism. Kant holds in contrast that the state is not an impediment to freedom but is the means for freedom. State action that is a hindrance to freedom can, when properly directed, support and maintain freedom if the state action is aimed at hindering actions that themselves would hinder the freedom of others. Given a subject's action that would limit the freedom of another subject, the state may hinder the first subject to defend the second by "hindering a hindrance to freedom". Such state coercion is compatible with the maximal freedom demanded in the principle of right because it does not reduce freedom but instead provides the necessary background conditions needed to secure freedom. The amount of freedom lost by the first subject through direct state coercion is equal to the amount gained by the second subject through lifting the hindrance to his actions. State action sustains the maximal amount of freedom consistent with identical freedom for all without reducing it." "The state is authorized to use its coercive force to defend freedom against limitations to freedom; more particularly, since right does not entail that each citizen must limit his own freedom but only that "freedom is limited" by conditions of right, it is right for another, i.e. the state, to actively limit citizens freedom in accord with right (6:231). The state is authorized to use force to defend property rights (6:256)."
  2. Two Concepts of Liberty, Isaiah Berlin, inaugural lecture before the University of Oxford on 31 October 1958. In Isaiah Berlin (1969) Four Essays on Liberty. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Chapter IV (pp. 14-16). University of Hamburg, accessed 2011-04-13

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